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Abstract​—Modern operating systems all support     
multi-users that users could share a computer simultaneously        
and not affect each other. However, there are some limitations.          
For example, privacy problem exists that users are visible to          
each other in terms of running processes and files. Moreover,          
users have little freedom to customize the system environment.         
Last, it is a burden for system administrator to safely manage           
and update system environment while satisfying multiple       
users.  
Facing the above problems, this paper proposes CUE, a         
Lightweight Container-based User Environment. CUE     
proposes a new notion that stands in between application         
container and operating system container: user container.       
CUE is able to give users more flexibility to customize their           
environment, achieve privacy isolation, and make system       
update easier and safer. Its goal is to optimize and enhance the            
multi-user notion of current operating system and being        
lightweight. Moreover, it is able to facilitate application        
deployment in high performance clusters. It is currently        
deployed in NUDT’s Tianhe E prototype supercomputer.       
Experiment results show that it introduces negligible overhead.  
Keywords—Multi-user, Privacy, Isolation, User container 
I. I​NTRODUCTION  
Modern operating systems are all multi-user systems as        
to enable multiple people to use seamlessly a single         
computer. In this scenario, there are two types of users:          
system administrator (root) and normal users (non-root       
users). Root user has full control of the system and is mainly            
responsible for maintaining the system environment on       
which non-root users run their daily jobs. In this sharing          
model, some shortcomings can be identified: 
(1) Privacy: Users are visible to each other in terms of          
running processes and files. For example, a user can see          
what others are running (using the ps command) and the          
files of others. When multi-users are sharing a server, users          
may not want this privacy exposure to happen. 
(2) Standard environment: All non-root users have      
little scope to customize the predefined system environment.        
Think about the following scenarios: “What if we have an          
application that links to a special library which has to be           
located in /lib or /usr/lib?”, “What if we want a specific glic            
version?”, “What if we need to change the configure file          
(located in /etc) for ssh?”. These simply things cannot be          
done with the current sharing model.  
(3) Unsafe system upgrade: When the root user wants        
to upgrade the system environment (for example, upgrade        
several libraries), the process may cause system crash or         
become unstable, making a set of applications and services         
not behave as before. Often, much effort is engaged to          
understand, diagnose, and then recover to the stable system         
environment. 
The described shortcomings are well known and we        
have plenty of tools to deal with parts of them, but not a             
coherent single approach supported by a single framework.        
For example, application container[1] (such as docker[2-5])       
addresses the problem of applications relying on various        
libraries. It packs applications along with their dependencies        
(libraries) and focuses on facilitating application      
deployment. In this model, users are building and running         
application containers instead of bare applications.      
However, for the users themselves (non-root users), they        
still have no right to customize the system environment they          
work/develop on. Moreover, the problems of privacy among        
users and unsafe system upgrade are not covered by this          
approach.  
It may be argued that we could build a larger container           
that contains the whole system and users can do everything          
inside their own containers, isolated from each other. This         
takes us to another approach: Operating system container        
(such as LXC [4], OpenVZ [6-7]) or virtual machine [8-13].          
They give each user a whole private system abstraction         
which is sometimes too heavyweight in terms of        
performance and management overhead. On one hand, these        
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 approaches usually introduce noticeable performance     
overhead. On another hand, they introduce more       
management overhead as they have changed the multi-user        
sharing concept. Every user now is the administrator of its          
own system (virtual machine or operating system container)        
and the root user is now responsible for managing these          
virtual machines. The virtual machines are black boxes to         
the root user and it is hard for the root user to help manage              
the environment inside each virtual machine.  
Above all, to share a computer, we often do not need           
virtual machines or application containers, we just need a         
more isolated and more flexible environment to enhance the         
multi-user sharing model.  
This paper proposes a new container framework situated        
between application container and operating system      
container (as well as virtual machine): user container. Based         
on the currently maturing container-related support in Linux        
kernel (e.g. namespace, cgroups, overlay file system)       
[14-20], we are able to provide a Lightweight        
Container-based User Environment (CUE) that solves the       
described shortcomings. In detail, CUE enables the       
following functionalities:  
(1) When non-root users login on a server, they        
automatically login into special containers that represent       
their own user environment. The environments are the same         
as the standard environment that the root user manages.         
Non-root Users can become root in their own user         
environments. From their point of view, they can see and          
modify (almost) all the files, which gives them much         
flexibility for customizing their own environments.      
Moreover, they cannot see the processes or files of other          
users’. All modifications will not be seen by other users,          
which improves privacy.  
(2) When the root user wants to update the system         
environment, he just does so. All users in their container          
will see the update immediately. For example, if the root          
user adds in new library in /lib, all non-root users will see            
the library immediately, even when they are isolated in         
different user environments. 
(3) When a non-root user does a customization, for        
example, replace a library with another special version, this         
customization has the highest priority. That is to say, after          
that if the root user updates the system environment and          
replaces the very library with a new version, the non-root          
user still sees his customized one. All other users see the           
updated one. 
(4) To achieve safe system update, the root user can         
also open a new user container, which has the same          
environment with the host at creation time. Then the root          
user can do all the update, test them well, and then do the             
update to the host environment.  
In summary, CUE gives users more flexibility to        
customize their environment, enables privacy isolation, and       
makes system update easier. It is currently used in NUDT's          
(National University of Defense Technology) high      
performance computers (Tianhe E prototype system) where       
several users are sharing one login node to do development          
and job allocation. The goal of CUE is to optimize and           
enhance the multi-user notion of current operating system        
and being lightweight. We have opensourced it at        
https://github.com/zhangwenzhe/NUDT-cue and hope it    
would be adopted widely. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2           
gives the background and discussion of related work. We         
introduce the design and implementation in Section 3.        
Section 4 gives and discusses typical use cases of CUE.          
Section 5 gives the experimental result and we conclude in          
Section 6. 
II. B​ACKGROUND​ ​AND​ R​ELATED​ W​ORK 
Virtualization [8] has a long history and has been studied          
extensively. It facilitates sharing, configuring, resource      
management, and many other aspects. Container [4] is a         
type of virtualization. Its history could be traced back to          
“chroot” [21] in UNIX, which was introduced to facilitate         
multi-user isolation and processes configuration. After that,       
“jail” from FreeBSD enables a more isolated model. At the          
same time, virtual machine (e.g. Xen, KVM [22]) was         
developing fast and widely adopted commercially,      
especially on cloud computing deployments. However, a       
key disadvantage of virtual machine is the performance        
overhead. As an alternative, OpenVZ [7] proposed a kind of          
operating system virtualization that could replace virtual       
machine in many cases and be much faster than traditional          
virtual machine. We refer to it as “operating system         
container” although at that time (around 2000-2005) the        
word “container” had not been used widely. It isolates a          
group of processes from many aspects to let the processes          
have the illusion of owning their own operating system.         
Realizing this needs much support from operating system        
kernel. OpenVZ made specific modifications to the Linux        
kernel to realize that and such modifications of Linux kernel          
were learnt by Linux group and partially adopted, which is          
currently the standard kernel support for modern container        
technologies. LXC (Linux Container) [23-24], based on the        
Linux namespaces, was proposed later. Like OpenVZ, LXC        
proposes the same notion of OS container, which is mainly          
meant to provide (almost) the same functionality that virtual         
machines do, but at lower performance cost. Until docker,         
the mainstream usage of container technology was not new,         
but just focused on providing a faster alternative to virtual          
machines. Unlike previous OS containers, Docker proposed       
a new notion called application container, which packs        
applications with all their dependences to facilitate the        
application deployment. Docker is also based on the existing         
Linux kernel support (namespace, cgroups, overlay file       
systems).  
 
Fig. 1. Notion of user container 
Above all, currently, talking about container, there are        
two mainstream models or notions: OS container and        
application container. OS container is like a virtual machine         
and gives a whole isolation. Application container is more         
 
 like a packing tool. They focus on different scenarios and          
both are quite successful. In this paper, we propose a new           
notion that stands in between OS container and application         
container: User container (Figure 1). Based on currently        
maturing container support in Linux kernel, we aim to         
enhance and optimize the traditional multi-user environment       
of operating system, enabling better privacy among users,        
more flexible system environment, and safe management       
and upgrade of system environment. We try to realize the          
above features and at the same time not to change the           
traditional notion of multi-user.  
There are also studies to embrace container technology        
in HPC (High Performance Computing) world.      
Shifter[25-26] and Singularity [27] are typical ones. They        
are both application containers and focus on application        
deployment on high performance clusters. Unlike them, our        
CUE focuses on enabling a more isolated and flexible         
development environment for multi-users to share a server.        
As we will show later as a use case, our CUE could also             
facilitate application deployment on high performance      
clusters. 
III. CUE - D​ESIGN​ ​AND​ I​MPLEMENTATION 
This section describes our design choices as well as the          
implementation of CUE. In short, in a user container, what a           
user can see and do. The source code is at          
https://github.com/zhangwenzhe/NUDT-cue. 
A. Isolation and Privacy 
When multi-users are sharing a server, users may want         
several things to be properly isolated. The spirit is, a user’s           
behavior should only be seen by himself and not to affect           
others’. 
1. File system 
In current multi-user model, the isolation mainly       
happens on the file system. Modern file systems are pretty          
mature that different controls (e.g. access rules) are applied         
to different files. However, there are two main drawbacks:  
(1) Non-root users cannot modify the common public        
files, e.g. libraries in /lib and configure files in /etc, which           
may be a limitation when non-root users want to customize          
the system environment.  
(2) If a non-root user makes a modification to the public           
system environment via “sudo”, e.g. change Python 2.7 to         
3.5, all other users will see the modification. It is not           
uncommon to have experienced a user makes a mistake         
while changing the system environment (common libraries,       
configure files and so on), which renders the systems         
unusable for other multi-users sharing the server. Thus, an         
ideal case is that if a user makes any modification, the           
modification should only be seen by that user, not by any           
others, while if the root makes a change to the system           
environment, the change should be seen by all.  
To solve the above problems, CUE gives each user a          
whole system environment. In other words, every user has         
its own files plus all public files (the files owned by root).            
Thus, users can make any customization of system        
environment as then need. Moreover, whenever they make        
any modification, the modification is only visible to        
themselves. CUE achieves this based on the overlay file         
system. The design is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Fig. 2. CUE’s file system isolation design 
For each user, CUE creates a user container by         
overlaying an empty folder on the host “/” (shown in Figure           
2) and chroot into the merged folder. Thus, from the point of            
view of each user, he sees the system environment the same           
as host. For all the public files owned by root, CUE gives            
the user root privilege to read and modify them. This          
enables users to customize their own system environment.        
For example, the user can change the glibc to another          
special version. Moreover, when he is doing this, the         
overlay system will put the new glibc in the upper layer,           
leaving the lower layer file system unchanged. This        
achieves the isolation that a user’s modification to the file          
system is only seen by himself, not by others. Above all,           
CUE gives non-root users more freedom to customize the         
system files and at the same time improves privacy among          
users. 
2. Process 
A user should only see the processes he runs. All other           
processes should not be visible to that user. CUE uses          
Linux’s pid namespace and remounts the proc file system to          
achieve process isolation for user container. 
3. Hostname 
As CUE allows users to do their customization on         
system files and configuration files, we use Linux UTS         
namespace to achieve hostname isolation. Users can       
customize the hostname. 
4. Device and Network 
In the traditional multi-user model, devices are shared by         
all users. CUE does the same and not to isolate devices.           
Unlike virtual machine that virtualizes devices for each        
virtual machine, CUE’s purpose is to enhance multi-user        
sharing model, not to give them the illusion that the          
computer is exclusively owned by one. Moreover, device        
virtualization is too heavy weight and may incur        
performance cost, especially for high performance      
computing. Thus, CUE simply exposes the host devices to         
the user container. For the same reason, CUE dose not          
virtualizes the network devices nor uses network namespace        
in Linux kernel. 
B. System Environment Management and Customization 
As mentioned in section 3.1.1, CUE actually gives each         
user a whole system environment and proper privileges to         
 
 make modification. Thus, they can make any customization        
and not to affect others. This is much like virtual machine.           
However, the difference is, it is easy for the root to manage            
the system environment for all users, not like the virtual          
machine scenario where the root is mainly responsible for         
managing virtual machines which are like block boxes.  
As shown in Figure 2, for all non-root users, CUE gives           
them an overlayed folder as their root directory to ensure          
isolation, while for root, he just sees and manages the lower           
layer. Thus, if he makes any modification to the lower layer,           
all users will see the modification. For example, if root user           
changes the /bin/python from version 2.7 to 3.5, all users          
will see the update. Furthermore, if a user likes to use           
Python 2.7, he is free to change it back to 2.7 without            
interfering others. Finally, once the user makes such        
customization, further update of this file by root will not be           
visible to the user. This is because the file is now located in             
the upper layer in the layered file system and further          
changes of the file in the lower layer will be masked. The            
spirit is, users are enabled to customize everything, and once          
they did, the customized version has the highest priority. For          
the non-customized files, it is the root’s job to manage and           
update them. 
C. Security and Capabilities 
In order to give unprivileged users more flexibility to         
customize the system environment, CUE gives them part of         
root privileges inside their own user containers. Each user         
logins into the user container as root. CUE relies on Linux           
capabilities to make fine-grained confine of what they can         
do.  
Users are enabled to bypass file and directory permission         
checks thus they can modify any files they want. As          
introduced before, we use overlay file system to achieve         
isolation. Arbitrary modification will not seen by others. For         
the files we do not want them to see or modify, we just use              
bind mount to mount an empty folder on it or remount it as             
read only. To make this control solid, users inside a user           
container is forbidden to do mount and umount.  
For devices, we also use bind mount to let users see the            
device which we want them to see. We also use bind mount            
to achieve read and write control. Mknod is forbidden inside          
user container because this is the job of the real root.           
Privileges about network are all dropped inside a user         
container.  
Other capabilities related to system administration      
operations are all dropped. For example,      
CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_SYS_MODULE may leave a      
door open to break into the kernel. CAP_SYS_BOOT may         
enable a user to do operations that affect others.  
Last, CUE relies on Linux namespace to achieve        
isolation: pid namespace to isolate process pid; mount        
namespace to isolate changes to file system; utc namespace         
to isolate hostname, etc. There have been a lot of studies           
revealing vulnerabilities of Linux namespace. However,      
current namespace is quite mature and the attacking of         
certain namespace is beyond the scope of this paper [28-29].  
To sum up, for security purpose, many of the capabilities          
are disabled for non-root users. After all, CUE is not meant           
to make non-root users become the true root. That is the           
work of traditional virtual machine. The spirit of CUE is to           
give users more freedom to make their own customization         
and improve privacy, to enhance the multi-user notion of         
current operating system.  
IV. U​SE​ C​ASES​ ​AND​ C​OMPARISON 
In this section we introduce some typical use case for          
CUE to highlight its contribution. 
A. Isolation and Customization 
The main purpose of CUE is to facilitate isolation and          
customization. For example, at first the pre-defined system        
environment has python of version 2.7. All users inside their          
user container see and use the python 2.7. Then a user           
(USERA) changes it to python 3.5. It is only the USERA           
sees and uses python 3.5 and others are still using 2.7. If the             
system administrator (root) updates the system python from        
2.7 to 3.0, then all users except USERA see the update and            
uses python 3.0 from then. For USERA, he still sees and           
uses his customized version of 3.5. This design greatly gives          
users flexibility to make customization to fit their special         
needs while giving the right to the root user to maintain the            
base environment. For isolation, users are isolated mainly in         
terms of processes and files. Thus, they feel they are owning           
a computer exclusively except that they know there is a real           
root that is managing the computer for them underneath. 
Moreover, CUE can help create different isolated       
environment for different projects that are hosted on one         
server. As we will show in experiment, the overhead is          
ignorable in terms of both time and space. 
B. Safe Update and Test of System Environment 
Another usage of CUE is for the real root to test the            
update the system environment safely. For example, without        
CUE, when the root wants to update several common libs,          
he just backups the old ones and replaces them with the new            
ones. After that the system may become unstable or may          
even crash. Much effort is engaged to recover the previous          
system state. With CUE, when the root wants to make          
update, he can just create a new user container. On the           
creation of the container, its environment is exactly the         
same with the host. Then the root can make update and test            
the environment well in the container. Once he has tested it           
well, he can merge the upper layer to the lower layer to            
make the update globally (see Figure 2). This process is          
much like making the update like a transaction, to be          
atomically. 
C. Integration into High Performance Clusters 
CUE is currently used in the prototype system (E         
prototype system) of our next generation of Tianhe super         
computer and we find this scenario is its best adoption.  
Figure 3 shows the Common architecture of Tianhe        
supercomputer series. Users login into one of the login         
nodes (assigned automatically) to do program development       
and compiling. Once the program is ready to run, the user           
uses the cluster management system to allocate compute        
nodes and submit a job to run the program in the allocated            
compute nodes. To facilitate date exchange, a globally        
shared storage is mounted at every node. 
 
  
Fig. 3. Common architecture of Tianhe supercomputer series 
CUE integrates into this scenario in the following two         
ways: 
(1) Facilitate multi-user sharing a login node.  
In high performance computer, often there are several         
users sharing a login node to do program development and          
compiling at the same time. Users are very sensitive of their           
privacy and they do not want others to know what they are            
running and to see their files. Thus, in this case CUE           
isolates users in terms of process and files.  
Moreover, users may want to customize their       
environment. For example, they have a program that links to          
a special library. Without CUE, this is achieved by putting          
the special library in just somewhere the user can access,          
and the program must be recompiled to link to that place.           
With CUE, use can just put the library in the system default            
places (/lib or /usr/lib) and not affect others.  
Finally, the root user can still manage the system         
environment for all user environments. CUE achieves a        
good balance in this scenario.  
(2) Enable fast application deployment. 
When a program needs to link to a special library, the           
original way is to first put the special library in the shared            
storage, and carefully set the link path in every allocated          
compute node so the compute node will find the library and           
run the program successfully. This deployment problem       
happens a lot. There have been a lot of studies trying to            
solve this problem for high performance computers. Shifter        
aims to introduce Docker’s large ecosystem to high        
performance world. It transforms Docker image to make it         
suitable to run in high performance clusters. So users can          
build their Docker images at their own desktop and deploy it           
in easily in cluster. Singularity follows the same way and is           
more lightweight. It is just a packing program and isolates          
as less as possible. It is also compatible with Docker image           
and its goal is also to enable users to deploy the app they             
prepare ready in their own desktop.  
However, high performance computers are highly      
customized, in terms of both hardware and software. The         
desktop on which users are building their Docker images         
may be quite different with the compute and login nodes in           
high performance clusters. For example, our Tianhe uses        
ARM ISA and Taihu-light uses Alpha ISA, while the         
majority of desktop and docker images are X86-based.        
Moreover, the software stack in high performance clusters        
are highly customized to fit its special hardware. Thus, the          
common scenario is that users need to develop and compile          
their program on the login node, not on their own desktop.           
In this scenario, the design of Shifter and Singularity is a bit            
redundant and could be optimized. For example, users use         
Shifter or Singularity command to pack their application        
well and send it to compute nodes to run. However, with           
CUE, we can achieve it easier.  
With CUE on each login node, users actually login into          
their special user container, do customization there, and        
tested program well. Then when users submit the job to run           
a program, the job management system will just send the          
whole user container to the allocated compute nodes thus all          
customizations are synchronized. This synchronizing     
process is transparent to users and they do not bother to use            
Shifter or Singularity command to pack the application.        
Sending the whole user container to allocated compute node         
may sound heavyweight but the implementation is quite        
lightweight. We just put the upper layers of user containers          
in the shared storage. When a user logins into a login node,            
the upper layer is overlayed on the host “/” to form the user             
container. When a user submits a job, the corresponding         
upper layer is overlayed on the “/” of allocated compute          
nodes. Thus, the compute nodes sees all the customization         
the user has made and this enables a fast and transparent           
application deployment. 
D. Comparison 
To summary, we give a comparison of our CUE with          
related work.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE I. C​OMPARESION​ ​WITH​ ​PREVIOUS​ ​WORK 
 
OpenVZ 
VM 
CUE Docker Shifter Singularity 
Main 
problem 
addresse
d 
Virtualiza
tion of 
system 
environm
ent or 
hardware. 
Enhance 
multi-user 
isolation. 
User 
Environmen
t isolation. 
Application deployment. 
Application packaging. 
Use 
mode 
Transpare
nt to 
users. 
Each VM 
is like 
black box 
to root. 
Transparent 
to users. 
Root 
manages the 
base 
environment 
for all users. 
Users use command to create and 
run containers. Uses themselves 
are not isolated nor privileged. 
 
 Isolation 
High, 
almost 
everythin
g isolated. 
Moderate, 
process and 
file systems 
isolated. 
Devices and 
network 
shared. 
High, by 
default 
isolate 
process, 
file 
systems, 
network,h
ostname, 
etc. 
Low, for HPC use, 
does not isolate 
much. Rely on 
SLURM to do 
node-level 
isolation. 
GPU or 
Accelera
tor 
Supported Supported Not support 
Supporte
d 
On the 
way 
Daemon NA No daemon Daemon No daemon 
No 
daemo
n 
SLURM
-friendly No Yes No Yes Yes 
V. E​XPERIMENT 
The goal of CUE is to provide convenient features to          
multi-users while being lightweight and high performance.       
In this section we mainly test its overhead compared with          
bare metal (running directly without any container or        
virtualization).  
The experimental platform is a login server of the         
Tianhe system. It is equipped with FT-1500A 16 cores CPU          
and 64GB of memory. 
First, Figures 4-5 show the overhead of CUE compared         
with bare metal and docker on the benchmark NPB [30]. For           
all the benchmarks, we select relatively large scale and run          
every benchmark for ten times. The average result is         
presented.  
We can see from the results that CUE introduces very          
little overhead (<1%). Running a process inside a user         
container is much like running it bare metal. The main          
overhead of containers is the overlay file system. However,         
as we use overlay file system in a limited way, we are able             
to limit the overhead. CUE just uses two layers of overlay.           
For most applications (especially high-performance     
computing application), they do not make modification to a         
large number of files in a short period, the overhead is very            
small. Docker introduces a little more overhead than CUE         
due to the overlay and namespace configuration: CUE uses         
less namespace than Docker.  
As a same trend, Figures 6-7 show the overhead on the           
benchmark Sysbench [31] and the result shows that CUE         
introduces ignorable overhead. 
 
Fig. 4. Overhead of running NPB (MPI on 4 processes) 
 
Fig. 5. Overhead of running NPB (serial) 
 
Fig. 6. Overhead of running CPU test of Sysbench  
 
Fig. 7. Overhead of running MEM test of Sysbench  
 
Fig. 8. Overhead of running Fio test  
 
  
Fig. 9. Overhead of stress tests of file operations  
Second, to show the overhead of file operations, we do          
Fio test and the result is shown in Figure 8. As we can see              
from the result, intense file operation is a main source of           
overhead for CUE, as well as Docker. Intense small files          
read or write would put great stress on overlay file system.  
Last, we do stress test to show the overhead of file           
operation. Our stress tests are: (1) small file read and small           
file write: read and write a lot of small files (16B * 10000).             
(2) read and write a big file (1G). For file read, we read all              
the file content and redirect the content to /dev/null. For file           
write, we flip every bit (0 to 1 or 1 to 0) sequentially. In              
order to reveal the overhead of the layered file system on           
which CUE is based, before the test all files are generated           
on the host. That is to say, all files are in the lower layer at               
first. The result is shown in Figure 9. 
We can see from Figure 9 that CUE introduces ignorable          
overhead for big file read and write. This is because the           
main overhead of the layered file system happens on         
managing file meta data. Thus, operating on small number         
of files would not hurt performance. This is also the typical           
scenario in high performance computing. Often HPC       
applications read or write to just a small number of big files.            
Second, reading a lot of small files also introduces little          
overhead, which just involves files searching in overlay file         
system. As CUE just uses 2 layers, this is not a performance            
problem. Last, the main overhead happens when writing to a          
lot of small files as shown in Figure 7. In this test CUE             
introduces about 4% overhead compared with bare-metal.       
This case is also the worst case for layered file system. We            
also argue that 4% overhead is acceptable and in most cases.           
In high performance computing, this seldom happens. 
Last, we test the container startup time of CUE and          
compare it with Docker as the startup time is also an           
important figure of merit for containers [32-34]. In the         
experiment, we start 100 containers and record the time. The          
file systems are the same and we start bash inside the           
container. The result is shown in Table 1. The startup of           
CUE is much faster than Docker. This is mainly due to the            
lightweight implementation of CUE. CUE adopts a       
non-daemon model while Docker relies on a daemon to start          
the container. The non-daemon model makes it easy to         
integrate with the job management systems [35] in high         
performance clusters. Moreover, starting a new CUE causes        
negligible space overhead (less than 100kb) as we just         
overlap an empty folder on the “/” of the host. Thus, CUE            
provides a very lightweight container to use. 
TABLE II. S​TARTUP​ ​TIME​ ​OF​ 100 ​CONTAINERS 
 CUE Docker 
Startup time 4.071s 29.065s 
VI. C​ONCLUSION 
This paper proposes CUE, a Lightweight      
Container-based User Environment. CUE implements a new       
container notion and framework that stands in between        
application container and operating system container: user       
container. CUE gives users more flexibility to customize        
their environment, achieves privacy isolation, and makes       
system update easier and safer when multi-users are sharing         
a computer. Its goal is to optimize and enhance the          
multi-user notion of current operating system and being        
lightweight. It also facilitates application deployment in       
high performance clusters. It is currently deployed on        
NUDT’s Tianhe E prototype supercomputer. Experiments      
show that CUE introduces negligible overhead. The startup        
time compared with Docker is more than one order of          
magnitude. 
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